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Abstract. The capability to store data about business processes exe-
cution in so-called Event Logs has brought to the diffusion of tools for
the analysis of process executions and for the assessment of the goodness
of a process model. Nonetheless, these tools are often very rigid in deal-
ing with with Event Logs that include incomplete information about the
process execution. Thus, while the ability of handling incomplete event
data is one of the challenges mentioned in the process mining manifesto,
the evaluation of compliance of an execution trace still requires an end-
to-end complete trace to be performed. This paper exploits the power of
abduction to provide a flexible, yet computationally effective, framework
to deal with different forms of incompleteness in an Event Log. Moreover
it proposes a refinement of the classical notion of compliance into strong
and conditional compliance to take into account incomplete logs. Finally,
performances evaluation in an experimental setting shows the feasibility
of the presented approach.
1 Introduction
The proliferation of IT systems able to store process executions traces in so-
called event logs has originated, in the Business Process community, a quest
towards tools that offer the possibility of discovering, checking the conformance
and enhancing process models based on actual behaviors [1]. Focusing on con-
formance, that is, on a scenario where the aim is to assess how a prescriptive (or
“de jure”) process model relates to the execution traces, a fundamental notion os
the one of trace compliance. Compliance results can be used by business analysts
to assess the goodness of a process model and understand how it relates to the
actual behaviours exhibited by a company, consequently providing the basis for
process re-design, governance and improvement.
The use of event logs to evaluate the goodness of a process model becomes
hard and potentially misleading when the event log contains only partial infor-
mation on the process execution. Thus, while the presence of non-monitorable
activities (or errors in the logging procedure) makes the ability of handling in-
complete event data one of the main challenges of the BP community, as men-
tioned in the process mining manifesto[1], still trace compliance of an execution
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trace requires the presence of a complete end-to-end execution trace to be eval-
uated. Notable exceptions are [2,3] where trace incompleteness is managed in an
algorithmic/heuristic manner using log repair techniques.
In this paper, we take an orthogonal approach and throughly address the
problem of log incompleteness from a formal/logic-based point of view, adopt-
ing an approach based on abduction [4]. Differently from techniques that focus
on algorithmic/heuristic repairs of an incomplete trace, we are interested in
characterising the notion of incomplete log compliance by means of a sound
and complete inference procedure. We rely on abduction to combine the partial
knowledge about the real executions of a process as reflected by a (potentially)
incomplete event log, with the background knowledge captured in a process
model. In particular, abductive reasoning handles different forms of missing in-
formation by formulating hypotheses that explain how the event log may be
“completed” with the missing information, so as to reconcile it with the process
model. This leads us to refine the classical notion of conformance-by-alignment
[5] between an execution trace and a process model into strong and conditional
compliance, to account for incompleteness. In detail, the paper provides: (i) a
classification of different forms of incompleteness of an event log based on three
dimensions: log incompleteness, trace incompleteness, and event description in-
completeness (Section 2.1); (ii) a reformulation of the notion of compliance into
strong and conditional compliance (Section 2.2); (iii) an encoding of structured
process models4 and of event logs in the SCIFF abductive logic framework [7],
and a usage of the SCIFF abductive proof procedure to compute strong, condi-
tional and non- compliance in presence of an incomplete event log (Section 3);
and (iv) an evaluation of the proposed framework in an experimental setting
(Section 4). The ideas presented in the paper paper are illustrated by means of a
simple explanatory example, and the comparison with related work is contained
in Section 5.
2 Dealing with Incomplete Event Logs
We aim at solving solve the problem of identifying compliant traces in the pres-
ence of incomplete event logs, given the prescriptive knowledge contained in a
process model. To do this, we first need to investigate what incomplete event
logs are (Section 2.1) and then understand how we can adapt the notion of
compliance to deal with partial data on the process execution (Section 2.2). We
perform this investigation with the help of a simple example, which in this paper
is described using the BPMN language5.
4 We focus on structured process models in the spirit of [6]. Broadly speaking, this
restricts to the class of models recursively composed of single-entry-single-exit blocks,
where every split has a corresponding join, matching its type. This assumption rules
out pathological patterns that are notoriously hard to characterise (e.g. involving
nested OR joins), still providing coverage for a wide range of interesting use cases.
5 For the sake of clarity we use BPMN, but our framework is language-independent.
Fig. 1: A process for obtaining a permit of stay (in Italy).
Example 1 (Obtaining a Permit of Stay in Italy). Consider the BPMN process
in Figure 1, hereafter called the Permit-Of-Stay (POS) process, which takes
inspiration from the procedure for the granting of a permit of stay in Italy.
Upon her arrival in Italy (AI), the person in need of a permit of stay has three
different alternatives: if she is from a EU country and remains in Italy for at
most 30 days, then only indicating her presence in Italy (DP) is needed; if she
is from the EU and must remain in Italy for more than 30 days, then she needs
to get an identity certificate (GIT) and present it (PIC). In all the remaining
cases she needs to fill a documentation (FD) which is then checked (CD). When
the documentation is correct, it is presented (PD) and a certificate is received
(RC). The procedure concludes with the provision of the permit of stay (SI).
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, the process only focuses on the so-called
“happy paths”, that is, the successful issuing of a permit of stay.
2.1 Classifying Process Execution (In)Completeness
We assume that each execution of the POS process in Figure 1 is (partially)
monitored and logged by an information system. We also assume that activities
are atomic, i.e., executing an activity results in an event associated to a single
timestamp: event (A, t) indicates that activity A has been executed at time t. A
sample trace6 that logs the execution of a POS instance is:
{(AI, t1), (FD, t2), (CD, t3), (PD, t4), (RC, t5), (SI, t6)} (1)
where ti > tj for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 6} such that i > j. This trace corresponds to
the execution of the lower branch of the POC process, where the loop is never
executed. A set of execution traces of the same process form an event log.
In many real cases, a number of difficulties may arise when exploiting the data
contained in an information system in order to build an event log. For instance,
data may bring only partial information in terms of which process activities have
been executed and what data or artefacts they produced. Thus, instead of the
extremely informative trace reported in (1), we may obtain something like:
{(FD, ), ( , t2), (SI, t6), ( , )} (2)
6 We often present the events in a trace ordered according to their execution time.
This is only to enhance readability since the position of an event is fully determined
by its timestamp, or unknown if the timestamp is missing.
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Fig. 2: Classifying (in)completeness.
This trace does not completely describe an execution of the POS process. For
example, the first event logged in the trace is FD. However, by looking at the
process description, it is easy to see that the first event of every execution has
to be AI. By assuming that the process executors indeed followed the prescrip-
tions of the model, this suggests that the AI-related event has not been logged.
Moreover, certain events have been only partially observed. For example, the
FD-related event is incomplete, because its exact timestamp is unkown. In this
paper, we use “ ” to denote a missing information unit.
In accordance with the IEEE standard XES format for representing event
logs [8], in general we can describe an event log as a set of execution traces.
Each trace, in turn, contains events, which are described by means of n-tuples,
where each element of the tuple is the value of a given attribute (see Figure 2a,
where we restrict to two attributes as we do in the paper). Consequently, we
can classify incompleteness along these three dimensions: incompleteness of the
log, incompleteness of the trace, and incompleteness of the event description (see
Figure 2b).
(In)Completeness of the log. Within this dimension we analyse whether all the
traces envisaged by the model are in the log or not. That is, we focus on un-
derstanding whether the log contains at least one instance for each possible
execution that is allowed in the model. Note that one can account for this form
of (in)completeness only by: (a) limiting the analysis to the control flow, without
considering complex data objects that may contain values from an unbounded
domain; and (b) assuming that there is a maximum length for all traces, thus
limiting the overall number of traces that may originate from the unbounded
execution of loops. An example of complete log for the POS process is:
L1 =
{(AI, ta1), (DP, ta2), (SI, ta3)},{(AI, tb1), (GIC, tb2), (PIC, tb3)(SI, tb4)},{(AI, tc1), (FD, tc2), (CD, tc3), (PD, tc4), (RC, tc5), (SI, tc6)}}
 (3)
where we assume that each trace cannot contain more than 6 event, which intu-
itively means that the loop is never executed twice.
Assuming this form of strict completeness is often unrealistic in practice.
In fact, even under the assumption of a maximum trace length, the number
of allowed traces could become extremely huge due to (bounded) loops, and
the (conditional) interleavings generated by parallel blocks and or choices. Still,
analysing the (in)completeness of an event log may be useful to discover parts
of the control flow that never occur in practice.
(In)completeness of the trace. Within this dimension we focus on a single trace,
examining whether it contains a sequence of events that corresponds to an exe-
cution foreseen by the process model from start to end. Trace (1) is an example
of complete trace. An example of incomplete trace is:
{(AI, t1), (PIC, t2)(SI, t3)} (4)
By looking at the POS model, it is easy to see that this trace should also contain
an event of the form (GIC, t), s.t. t1 < t < t2.
(In)completeness of the event description. Within this dimension we focus on
the completeness of a single event. Events are usually described as complex
objects containing data about the executed activity, its time stamp, and so on
[8]. These data can be missing or corrupted. As pointed out before, we consider
activity names and timestamps. Thus, incompleteness in the event description
may concern the activity name, its timestamp, or both. This is reflected in trace
(2): (i) event (FD, ) indicates that activity FD has been executed, but at an
unknown time; (ii) ( , t2) witnesses that an activity has been executed at time
t2, but we do not know which; (iii) ( , ) attests that the trace contains some
event, whose activity and time are unknown.
In general, we can characterise the (in)completeness of an event log in terms of
(any) combination of these three basic forms. At one extreme, we may encounter
a log that is complete along all three dimensions, such as the one depicted in
(3). At the other extreme, we may instead have the following log:
L2 = {{(AI, ), ( , ta2)}, {(AI, tb1), ( , ), ( , tb2), (SI, tb3)}} (5)
characterised by incompleteness of the log, incompleteness of some traces, and
incompleteness of some event descriptions. Intermediate situations may obvi-
ously arise as well. This is graphically depicted in the lattice of Figure 2c, where
〈L, T,E〉 indicates the top value (completeness for all three dimensions) and
〈•, •, •〉 indicated the bottom value (incompleteness of all three dimensions).
2.2 Refining the Notion of Compliance
In our work we consider prescriptive process models, that is, models that de-
scribe the only acceptable executions. These corresponds to the so-called “de
jure” models in [5], and consequently call for a definition of compliance, so as
to characterise the degree to which a given trace conforms/is aligned to the
model. The traditional notion of compliance is typically considered under the
assumption that the trace is a faithful footprint of reality, and requires that the
trace represents an end-to-end, valid execution that can be fully replayed on the
process model. We call this notion of compliance strong compliance. Trace (1)
is an example of trace that is fully compliant to the POS process.
Strong compliance is too restrictive when the trace is possibly incomplete.
In fact, the incompleteness in a trace hinders the possibility of replaying it on
the process model. However, full conformance might be regained by assuming
that the trace included additional activities and/or specific information on the
missing data; in this case we say that the trace is conditionally compliant,
to reflect that compliance conditionally depends on how the partial information
contained in the trace is complemented with the missing one. Consider again the
POS example and the partial trace:
{(AI, t1), (GIC, )(SI, t3)} (6)
It is easy to see that the observed trace is compliant with POS, if we assume
that
GIC was executed at a time ti s.t. t1 < ti < t3 (7)
an execution of PIC was performed at a time tj s.t. ti < tj < t3 (8)
Note that the set of assumptions needed to reconstruct full conformance is not
necessarily unique. This reflects that, in general, alternative strongly compliant
real process executions might have led to the recorded partial trace. On the other
hand, there are situations in which it is not possible to formulate additional
assumptions on the partial trace to recover full conformance. In this case, the
partial trace is considered non-compliant. For example, trace
{(AI, t1), (GIC, )(CD, t2)(SI, t3)} (9)
does not comply with POS, since it records that GIC and CD have been both
executed, although they belong to mutually exclusive branches in the model.
3 Abduction and Incomplete Logs
Since the aim of this paper is to provide automatic procedures, embedded in a
tool, that identify compliant traces in the presence of incomplete event logs, given
the prescriptive knowledge contained in a process model, we can schematise the
input to our problem in three parts: (i) an instance-independent component, the
process model, which in this paper is described using BPMN; (ii) an instance-
specific component, that is, the (partial) log, and (iii) meta-information attached
to the activities in the process model, indicating which are actually always, never
or possibly observable (that is, logged) in the event log. The third component is
an extension of a typical business process specification that we propose (following
and extending the approach described in [9]) to provide prescriptive information
about the (non-) observability of activities. Thus, for instance, a business ana-
lyst will have the possibility to specify that a certain manual activity is never
observable while a certain interaction with a web site is always (or possibly)
observable. This information can then be used to compute the compliance of a
partial trace. In fact the presence of never observable activities will trigger the
need to make hypothesis on their execution (as they will never be logged in the
event log), while the presence of always observable activities will trigger the need
to find their corresponding event in the execution trace (to retain compliance).
Note that this extension is not invasive w.r.t. current approaches to business
process modelling, as we can always assume that a model where no information
on observability is provided is entirely possibly observable.
Given the input of our problem, we structure this section as follows: first, we
provide an overview on abduction and on how the SCIFF framework represents
always, never or possibly observable activities; then, we show how to use SCIFF
to encode a process model and a partial log (Section 3.2), third we show how
we can formalize, and therefore make precise, the informal different forms of
compliance presented in Section 2.2 (Section 3.3); finally, we illustrate how the
SCIFF proof procedure can be used to solve the different forms of incompleteness
identified in Section 2.1 (Section 3.4).
3.1 The SCIFF in short
Abduction is a non-monotonic reasoning process where hypotheses are made to
explain observed facts [10]. While deductive reasoning focuses on deciding if a
formula φ logically follows from a set Γ of logical assertions known to hold,
in abductive reasoning it is assumed that φ holds (as it corresponds to a set of
observed facts) but it cannot be directly inferred by Γ . To make φ a consequence
of Γ , abduction looks for a further set ∆ of hypothesis, taken from a given set
of abducible A, which complements Γ in such a way that φ can be inferred (in
symbols Γ∪∆ |= φ). The set ∆ is called abductive explanation (of φ). In addition,
∆ must usually satisfy a set of (domain-dependent) integrity constraints IC (in
symbols, Γ ∪ ∆ |= IC). A typical integrity constraint (IC) is a denial, which
expresses that two explanations are mutually exclusive.
Abduction has been introduced in Logic Programming in [4]. There, an Ab-
ductive Logic Program (ALP) is defined as a triple 〈Γ,A, IC〉, where: (i) Γ is a
logic program, (ii) A is a set of abducible predicates, and (iii) IC a set of ICs.
Given a goal φ, abductive reasoning looks for a set of literals ∆ ⊆ A such that
they entail φ ∪ IC.
In this paper we leverage on the SCIFF abductive logic programming frame-
work [7], an extension of the IFF abductive proof procedure [11]. Beside the
general notion of abducible, the SCIFF framework has been enriched with the
notions of happened event, expectation, and compliance of an observed execution
with a set of expectations. This makes SCIFF suitable for dealing with event log
incompleteness. Let a be an event corresponding to the execution of a process ac-
aH(a, T ) ABD(a, T )
a observable a non-observable
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τ .
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Fig. 3: Encoding always/never observable activities.
tivity, and T (possibly with subscripts) its execution time7. Abducibles are used
here to make hypothesis on events that are not recorded in the examined trace.
They are denoted using ABD(a, T ). Happened events are non-abducible, and
account for events that have been logged in the trace. They are denoted with
H(a, T ). Expectations E(a, T ), instead, model events that should occur (and
therefore should be present in a trace). Compliance is described in Section 3.3.
ICs in SCIFF are used to relate happened events / abduced predicates with
expectations / predicates to be abduced. Specifically, an IC is a rule of the form
body → head, where body contains a conjunction of happened events, general
abducibles, and defined predicates, while head contains a disjunction of con-
junctions of expectations, general abducibles, and defined predicates.
3.2 Encoding Structured Processes and Their Executions in SCIFF
Let us illustrate how to encode all the different components of an (incomplete)
event log and a structured process model one by one.
Event Log. A log is a set of traces, each constituted by a set of observed (atomic)
events. Thus trace (4) is represented in SCIFF as {H(AI, t1),H(PIC, t2),H(SI, t3)}.
Always/never observable activities. Coherently with the representation of an ex-
ecution trace, the logging of the execution of an observable activity is represented
in SCIFF using an happened event, whereas the hypothesis on the execution of
a never observable activity is represented using an abducible ABD (see Fig-
ure 3a). Given an event a occurring at T , we use a function τ that represents
the execution of a as:
τ(a, T ) =
{
H(a, T ) if a is observable
ABD(a, T ) if a is never observable
As for expected occurrences, the encoding again depends on the observability of
the activity: if the activity is observable, then its expected occurrence is mapped
to a SCIFF expectation; otherwise, it is hypothesised using the aforementioned
7 In the remainder of this paper we will assume that the time domain relies on natural
numbers.
abducible ABD (see Figure 3b). To this end we use a function ε that maps the
expecting of the execution of a at time T as follows:
ε(a, T ) =
{
E(a, T ) if a is observable
ABD(a, T ) if a is never observable
Structured process model constructs. A process model is encoded in SCIFF by
generating ICs that relate the execution of an activity to the future, expected ex-
ecutions of further activities. In practice, each process model construct is trans-
formed into a corresponding IC. We handle, case-by-case, all the single-entry
single-exit block types of structured process models.
Sequence. Two activities a and b are in sequence if, whenever the first is exe-
cuted, the second is expected to be executed at a later time:
τ(a, Ta)→ ε(b, Tb) ∧ Tb > Ta. (10)
Xor-split extends sequence with the possibility of selecting one among multiple
target activities. In SCIFF, this is captured using an IC with a disjunction in
the consequent. In particular, the fact that if a is executed, then either b or c is
expected to be executed next is encoded as:
τ(a, Ta)→ ε(b, Tb) ∧ Tb > Ta ∨ ε(c, Tc) ∧ Tc > Ta.
Xor-join indicates that, no matter which activity is executed among the in-
put set of activities for the xor-join, then the output activity of the xor-join is
expected to be executed. Hence, the encoding of xor-join can be obtained by
encoding all its implied sequences. For example, if a or b are followed by c, we
obtain:
τ(a, Ta)→ ε(c, Tc) ∧ Tb > Ta. τ(b, Tb)→ ε(c, Tc) ∧ Tc > Tb.
And-split activates parallel threads spanning from the same activity. In par-
ticular, the fact that activity a triggers two parallel threads, one expecting the
execution of b, and the other that of c, is captured using an IC with a conjunctive
consequent:
τ(a, Ta)→ ε(b, Tb) ∧ Tb > Ta ∧ ε(c, Tc) ∧ Tc > Ta.
And-join mirrors the and-split, synchronizing multiple concurrent execution
threads and merging them into a single thread. When activities a and b are
both executed, then activity c is expected next, is captured using an IC with a
conjunctive antecedent:
τ(a, Ta) ∧ τ(b, Tb)→ ε(c, Tc) ∧ Tc > Ta ∧ Tc > Tb.
Or-split/or-join are captured by combining the formalization of and-/xor-
elements, considering the well-known equivalence between an or-split/-join and
an xor-split/-join whose alternative branches correspond to an element in the
powerset of the split-targets/join-sources, whose inner activities are put in par-
allel. For example, the fact that a leads to an or-split pointing to b and c is
equivalent to an xor-split that connects a to three outputs: one containing b, one
containing c, and one containing b and c in parallel.
Possibly observable activities. A possibly observable activity is managed by con-
sidering the disjunctive combination of two cases: one in which it is assumed
to be observable, and one in which it is assumed to be never observable. This
idea is used to refine ICs used to encode the workflow constructs in the case of
partial observability. For instance, if a partially observable activity appears in
the antecedent of an IC, two distinct ICs are generated, one where the activity
is considered to be observable (H), and another in which it is not (ABD). Thus
in the case of a sequence flow from a to b, where a is possibly observable and b
is observable, IC (10) generates:
H(a, Ta) → ε(b, Tb) ∧ Tb > Ta.
ABD(a, Ta) → ε(b, Tb) ∧ Tb > Ta.
If multiple partially observable activities would appear in the antecedent of an
IC (as, e.g., in the and-join case), then all combinations have to be considered.
Similarly, if a partially observable activity appears in the consequent of an
IC, a disjunction must be inserted in the consequent, accounting for the two
possibilities of observable/never observable event. If both the antecedent and
consequent of an IC would contain a partially observable activity, a combination
of the rules above will be used. For example, in the case of a sequence flow from
a to b, where b is possibly observable, IC (10) generates:
H(a, Ta)→ E(b, Tb) ∧ Tb > Ta ∨ABD(b, Tb) ∧ Tb > Ta.
With this encoding, the SCIFF proof procedure generates firstly an abductive
explanation ∆ containing an expectation about the execution of b. If no b is ac-
tually observed, ∆ is discarded, and a new abductive explanation ∆′ is generated
containing the hypothesis about b (i.e., ABD(b, Tb) ∈ ∆′). Mutual exclusion be-
tween these two possibilities is guaranteed by the SCIFF declarative semantics
(cf. Definition 3).
Finally, if both the antecedent and consequent of an IC would contain a
possibly observable activity, a combination of the rules above will be used.
3.3 Compliance in SCIFF: Declarative Semantics
We are now ready to provide a formal notion of compliance in its different
forms. We do so by extending the SCIFF declarative semantics provided in [7]
to incorporate log incompleteness (that is, observability features).
A structured process model corresponds to a SCIFF specification S = 〈KB,A, IC〉,
where: (i) KB is a Logic Program [12] containing the definition of accessory pred-
icates; (ii) A = {ABD/2,E/2}; (iii) IC is a set of ICs constructed by following
the encoding defined in Section 3.2. A (execution) trace and an abductive ex-
planation ∆ are defined as follows:8:
Definition 1. A Trace T is a set of terms of type H(e, Ti), where e is a term
describing the happened event, and Ti ∈ N is the time instant at which the event
occurred.
8 We do not consider the abductive goal, as it is not needed for our treatment.
Definition 2 (Abductive explanation ∆). Given a SCIFF specification S
and a trace T , a set ∆ ⊆ A is an abductive explanation for 〈S, T 〉 if and only
if
Comp (KB ∪ T ∪∆) ∪ CET∪TN |= IC
where Comp is the (two-valued) completion of a theory [13], CET stands for
Clark Equational Theory [14] and TN is the CLP constraint theory [15] for inte-
gers.
The following definition fixes the semantics for observable events, and provides
the basis for understanding the alignment of a trace with a process model.
Definition 3 (T -Fulfillment). Given a trace T , an abducible set ∆ is T -
fulfilled if for every event e ∈ ∆ and for each time t, E(e, t) ∈ ∆ if and only if
H(e, t) ∈ T .
The “only if” direction defines the semantics of expectation, indicating that
an expectation is fulfilled when it finds the corresponding happening event in
the trace. The “if” direction captures the prescriptive nature of process models,
whose closed nature require that only expected event may happen.
Given an abductive explanation ∆, fulfilment acts as a compliance classifier,
which separates the legal/correct execution traces with respect to ∆ from the
wrong ones.
Definition 4 ((Strong/Conditional) Compliance). A trace T is compliant
with a SCIFF specification S if there exists an abducible set ∆ such that: (i) ∆
is an abductive explanation for 〈S, T 〉, and (ii) ∆ is T -fulfilled. If ∆ does not
contains any ABD then we say that it is strongly-compliant, otherwise it is
conditionally-compliant.
If no abductive explanation that is also T -fulfilled can be found, then T is
not compliant with the specification of interest. Contrariwise, the abductive
explanation witnesses compliance. However, it may contain ABD predicates,
abduced due to the incompleteness of T . In fact, the presence or absence of
such predicates determines whether T is conditionally or strongly compliant. To
make an example of how Definition 4 help us solve the problem of compliance
of a single trace, let us consider traces (6), (1) and (9), of the POS example. In
the case of partial trace (6), SCIFF will tell us that it is conditional compliant
with the workflow model POS since ∆ will contain the formal encoding of the
two abducibles (7) and (8) which provide the abductive explanation of trace (6).
In the case of (complete) trace (1), abduction will tell us that it directly follows
from Γ without the need of any hypothesis. The case ∆ = ∅ coincides in fact,
with the classical notion of (deductive) compliance. Finally, if we consider the
partial trace (9) SCIFF will tell us that it is not possible to find any set of
hypothesis ∆ that explains it. The case of no ∆ coincides, therefore with the
classical notion of (deductive) non-compliance.
We close this section by briefly arguing that our approach is indeed cor-
rect. To show correctness, one may proceed in two steps: (i) prove the semantic
correctness of the encoding w.r.t. semantics of (conditional/strong) compliance;
(ii) prove the correctness of the proof procedure w.r.t. the SCIFF declarative
semantics. Step (i) requires to prove that a trace is (conditionally/strong) compli-
ant (in the original execution semantics of the workflow) with a given workflow
if and only if the trace is (conditionally/strong) compliant (according to the
SCIFF declarative semantics) with the encoding of the workflow in SCIFF. This
can be done in the spirit of [16] (where correctness is proven for declarative,
constraint-based processes), by arguing that structured processes can be seen as
declarative processes that only employ the “chain-response constraint” [16]. For
step (ii), we rely on [7], where t soundness and completeness of SCIFF w.r.t. its
declarative semantics is proved by addressing the case of closed workflow models
(the trace is closed and no more events can happen anymore), as well as that of
open workflow models (future events can still happen). Our declarative seman-
tics restricts the notions of fulfilment and compliance to a specific current time
tc, i.e., to open traces: hence soundness and completeness still hold.
3.4 Dealing with Process Execution (In)Completeness in SCIFF
We have already illustrated, by means of the POS example, how Definition 4
can be used, at a very abstract level, to address compliance of a partial trace.
In this section we illustrate more in detail how SCIFF can be used to solve the
three domensions of incompleteness identified in Section 2.1.
Trace and event incompleteness are dealt by with SCIFF in a uniform man-
ner. In fact, the trace/event incompleteness problem amounts to check if a
given log (possibly equipped with incomplete traces/events), is compliant with
a prescriptive process model. We consider as input the process model, together
with information about the observability of its activities, a trace, and a maxi-
mum length for completed traces. The compliance is determined by executing the
SCIFF proof procedure and evaluating possible abductive answers. We proceed
as follows:
1. We automatically translate the process model with its observability meta-
information into a SCIFF specification. If observability information is miss-
ing for some/all the activities, we can safely assume that some/all activities
are possibly observable.
2. The SCIFF proof procedure is applied to the SCIFF specification and to the
trace under observation, computing all the possible abductive answers ∆i.
The maximum trace length information is used to limit the search, as in the
unrestricted case the presence of loop may lead to nontermination.
3. If no abductive answer is generated, the trace is deemed as non-compliant.
Otherwise, a set of abductive answers {∆1, . . . ,∆n} has been found. If there
exists a ∆i that does not contain any ABD predicate, then the trace is
strongly compliant. The trace is conditionally compliant otherwise.
Note that, assessing strong/conditional compliance requires the computation of
all the abductive answers, thus affecting the performances of the SCIFF proof
Fig. 4: University admission process
procedure. If only compliance is needed (without classifying it in strong or con-
ditional), it is possible to compute only the first solution.
A different scenario is provided by the log incompleteness problem, which
instead focuses on an entire event log, and looks if some possible traces allowed
by the model are indeed missing in the log. In this case we consider as input the
process model, a maximum length for the completed traces, and a log consisting
of a number of different traces; we assume each trace is trace- and event-complete.
We proceed as follows:
1. We generate the SCIFF specification from the process model, considering all
activities as never observable.
2. The SCIFF proof procedure is applied to the SCIFF specification. All the
possible abductive answers ∆i are computed, with maximum trace length as
specified. Each answer corresponds to a different execution instance allowed
by the model. Since all the activities are never observable, the generated ∆i
will contain only ABD.
3. For each hypothesised trace in the set {∆1, . . . ,∆n}, a corresponding, dis-
tinct trace is looked for in the log. If all the hypothesised traces have a
distinct matching observed trace, then the log is deemed as complete.
Notice that, beside the completeness of the log, the proof procedure also generate
the missing traces, defined as the ∆i that do not have a corresponding trace in
the log.
4 Evaluation
Section 3.4 illustrates how the eight problems obtained by combining the three
incompleteness dimensions can be actually solved by means of two algorithms.
We now test such algorithms and study how different inputs affect their perfor-
mances. As special input, we indicate whether SCIFF must compute all possible
abductive explanations, or a simple yes/no answer to the compliance decision
problem suffices (the latter can be answered affirmatively by stopping after hav-
ing found the first abductive explanation).
For each type of incompleteness we consider, possibly only some input pa-
rameters are of interest, as, for instance, the information on the observability of
activities does not impact the log incompleteness resolution (being each trace
in the log assumed complete). Hence, for each problem we select the signifi-
cant parameters only and perform tests by varying them in order to thoroughly
understand their practical influence.
As for the model, we choose a real-life process made available within the
Process Matching Contest 2013 [17], describing the admission procedure to the
Input Output Trace Incompl. Output Trace and Event Incompl.
% AOA # OE TML Cc CcT (ms) # sol. CT (ms) Cc CcT (ms) # sol. CT (ms)
16 YES 78 2 213 YES 234 28 7069
1
32 YES 109 16 915 YES 219 694 36754
16 NO 551 0 551 NO 24209 0 24209
5
32 YES > 4h 6 6759 YES > 4h 134 270278
16 NO 38966 0 38966 NO 2139880 0 2139880
0
15
32 YES 683073 36 13599417 > 4h > 4h
16 NO 266 0 20 YES 266 2 124
1
32 NO 16 0 16 YES 234 2 405
16 NO 548 0 548 YES 3151 1 3650
5
32 YES 124 1 157 YES 2964 1 4493
16 NO 43209 0 43209 YES 255483 1 28980
15%
15
32 YES 25210 36 13257351 YES 255483 1 245810
16 NO 31 0 31 NO 156 0 156
1
32 NO 31 0 31 NO 187 0 187
16 NO 16 0 16 NO 202 0 202
5
30 NO 31 0 31 NO 256 0 256
16 YES 874 1 999 YES 9734 1 8346
50%
15
32 YES 827 1 1123 YES 12730 1 9812
Table 1: Results related to the trace and trace and event incompleteness.
Frankfurt University. Notably, in order to exercise the encoding on various pro-
cess elements, a parallel branch and a loop have been added to the original
procedure. Figure 4 shows the resulting model9, which is composed of 29 activ-
ities, 3 xor-splits/joins, and 1 and-split/join. If no loop iteration is considered,
the model contains 8 distinct paths. The experiments have been carried out on
a Windows 7 pc with 8GB RAM and a 2.4 GhZ Intel-core i7.
Log incompleteness. We evaluated the algorithm by varying the number of
(complete) traces in the log and the bound on the length of the traces. Results
shows that the number of solutions is proportional to the trace max length
parameter and inversely proportional to the number of traces already presented
in the log. Computing times are below 1 sec, and proportional to the number of
solutions returned.
Trace/event incompleteness. We first feed the algorithm with a partial trace
and complete events, thus testing the trace incompleteness problem. Table 1 is
used to summarize the numerical values obtained, where each row represents a
test case and columns report the input values used, the output and the computing
time. As for the activity observability, we chose as parameter the percentage of
activities that we know to be always/never observable (%AOA) and let it ranging
among 0% (no certain information about activity observability is available at all),
around 15% ( observability is known with certainty only for a small number of
activities) and 50% (for about half of the activities of the diagram we know
whether they are for sure observable or not). Concerning the trace, we look at
9 The model is included for providing an intuition of its complexity and no description
is provided.
the number of observed events in the trace (#OE). Also in this case, we chose to
make the parameter varying among a trace almost incomplete (1), with a small
number of observed events (5) and with a medium number of observed events
(15). Finally, we let the trace maximum length (TML) ranging among the values
16 (shortest path without loop) and 32 (up to 2 loops).
The table shows that the computation time when all possible completions are
returned (CT) is proportional to the bound on the length of the traces (TML)
and the number of completions found (#sol). Indeed, when one or more solutions
are found, the computation time for the compliance decision problem (CcT ) is
roughly CT/#sol. On the contrary, the percentage of always observed activities
in the model (%AOA) significantly reduces the exploration space, thus linearly
decreasing the computation time. Interestingly, the more events we observe in
the trace (column #OE) the higher the computation time is. This is because, as
explained in Subsection 3.4, for each expectation about a (possibly observable)
activity in the model which can potentially match (unify with) an event observed
in the trace, two cases must be explored: either (i) the expectation is matched
with the event in the trace, or (ii) an abductive explanation is generated for
that activity. We remark that the presence of loops in the model requires both
the alternatives to be explored, if we want to guarantee that all completions are
returned.
The rightmost part of Table 1 shows the results obtained by feeding the
procedure with an incomplete trace containing an incomplete event. Here, the
same considerations of the trace incompleteness test described above can be
drawn. The only difference lies in the fact that a high number of incomplete
events (i.e., events lacking their description and, in particular, their name) let the
computation time rise exponentially, as multiple possibilities for each incomplete
event must be explored when looking for the set of all possible completions.
Again, this is the price we pay to get the completeness of the results, which
however can (in general) be avoided by asking for compliance only, as displayed
by column CnT in Table 1.
We close the section by analyzing event incompleteness, that is a particular
case of the trace and event incompleteness described above. In this case, the
incompleteness is on the event description only (see Section 2.1), hence an input
trace is characterized by a number of observed events equals to the length of the
trace, and, among these, a number of missing event descriptions. From the com-
putational viewpoint, this represents the most challenging setting, as both the
above parameters cause an exponential increase in the computation times. We
reckoned that for an input trace of length 16, even two missed event description
brings the computation time up to a couple of hours.
4.1 Discussion
The purpose of the experimentation was to stress the algorithm in borderline
cases. Indeed, we remark that on the one hand we made the model convoluted
on purpose especially by adding a loop, which is a source of complexity, and on
the other we tested situations that are very unlikely to happen in practice. We
can safely assume that in typical scenarios the number of (partially) observable
activities, which in most of the cases are human-performed, is usually no more
than half of the overall activities (i.e., %AOA > 50%) and that from the %AOA
parameter and the length of the partial trace, a good estimate of the bound on
the trace length can be set, thus avoiding useless loop (when present) iterations.
In such settings the performance of the abductive procedure on the different
types of incompleteness are reasonable. For instance, for the compliance, they
range from few seconds when at most a single event description is completely
unknown to about 4.5 minutes when up to 4 event descriptions are missing.
5 Related Work
The problem of incomplete traces has been tackled by a number of works in the
field of process discovery and conformance. Some of them [2,3] have addressed the
problem of aligning event logs and procedural/declarative process models [2,3].
Such works explore the search space of the set of possible moves to find the
best one for aligning the log to the model. Our purpose is not managing generic
misalignments between models and logs, but rather focus on a special type of
incompleteness: the model is correct and the log could be incomplete.
We can divide existing works that aim at constructing possible model-compliant
“worlds” out of a set of observations with incomplete information in two groups:
quantitative and qualitative approaches. The former rely on the availability of a
probabilistic model of execution and knowledge. For example, in [18] the authors
exploit stochastic Petri nets and Bayesian Networks to recover missing informa-
tion. The latter stand on the idea of describing “possible outcomes” regardless
of likelihood. Among these approaches, the issue of reconstructing missing infor-
mation has been tackled in [19] and in [9], respectively leveraging Satisfiability
Modulo Theory, and planning techniques.
In this work, the notion of incompleteness has been investigated and extended
to take into account its different variants (log incompleteness, trace incomplete-
ness and event incompleteness). Similarly, the concept of observability has been
deeper investigated and extended, by exploring the case of activities always,
partially or never observable. This has led to a novel classification of different
“degrees” of compliance.
Abduction and the SCIFF framework have been previously used to model
both procedural and declarative processes. In [20], a structured workflow lan-
guage has been defined, with a formal semantics in SCIFF. In [21], SCIFF has
been exploited to formalize and reason about the declarative workflow language
Declare.
An interesting work where trace compliance is evaluated through abduc-
tion is presented in [22]. However, they define compliance as assessing if actions
were executed by users with the right permissions (auditing), and focus only on
incomplete traces (with complete events), while we take a more sophisticated
approach to incompleteness. The adopted abductive framework, CIFF [23], only
supports ground abducibles, and ICs are limited to denials. The work in [22]
explores also the dimension of human confirmation of hypotheses, and proposes
a human-based refinement cycle. This is a complementary step with our work,
and would be an interesting direction for future work.
6 Conclusions
We have presented an abductive framework to support business process moni-
toring (and in particular compliance checking) by attacking the different forms
of incompleteness that may be present in an event log. Concerning future de-
velopment, the SCIFF framework is based on first-order logic, thus paving the
way towards (i) the incorporation of data [24], (ii) extensions to further types of
workflows (e.g., temporal workflows as in [25]), and (iii) towards the investigation
of probabilistic models to deal with incompleteness of knowledge.
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